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Abstract 
Crowdfunding is an online platform service that helps creators develop their projects by collecting small 
amounts of money from the public. This paper examines the relationship between funder motivations 
and actual funding behavior on crowdfunding platforms. We combine two types of datasets; namely, 
funder surveys and actual transaction data, to empirically probe the dynamics among reward 
motivation, philanthropy motivation, funding timing, and funding amount. We further examine how the 
dynamics are moderated by funders’ demographic characteristics. We find that reward motivation is 
associated with late funding, whereas philanthropic motivation is associated with early funding. When 
it comes to the funding amount, philanthropy motivation is positively associated with the amount of 
funding, especially in the earlier stages before reaching the goal amount. On the other hand, the effect 
of reward motivation on funding amount is, on average, positive, although very marginal. Overall, our 
results provide new insights for theories of contributions in crowd-driven markets.  
 
Keywords: Crowdfunding, funder motivation, reward motivation, philanthropy motivation, funding 
timing, funding amount 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Online platforms are transforming a variety of businesses and activities by facilitating more efficient 
transactions (Van Alstyne et al. 2016). For instance, crowdfunding markets, i.e., online platforms for 
funding, provide infrastructure that facilitates interactions between creators with ideas and funders. 
Crowdfunding platforms help creators develop their projects by allowing them to raise online funding 
from the public. In addition, crowdfunding allows for easy participation of regular people in backing 
interesting projects. By creating efficiencies in matching, crowdfunding is gaining popularity in 
different types of projects such as social ventures, creative works, and technology projects. Since 
crowdfunding generally allows for different rewards in diverse projects, it is likely that funders 
participate in crowdfunding with various motivations. However, few empirical studies consider the role 
of funder motivation in crowdfunding, an aspect that likely affects the success of a funding campaign. 
If funders participate in a campaign with different motivations and their motivations determine their 
funding decisions, funder motivations will also affect the campaign’s success. Essentially, the previous 
literature on crowd participation (e.g., crowdsourcing) suggests that the size of a person’s contribution 
depends on their motivation (Arazy et al. 2012; Burtch et al. 2015; Hutter et al. 2015; Leimeister et al. 
2009; Roberts et al. 2006). Our study extends this literature by showing that a person’s motivations 
affect timing of funding (hereafter: funding timing) as well as funding amount in the context of 
crowdfunding, where funding progression is publicly shown to be so very salient to potential funders.  
Among possible sets of funder motivations leading to participation in crowdfunding projects, we focus 
on two prominent and corresponding motivations: reward and philanthropy (Gerber et al. 2012). The 
reward motivation refers to the desire to receive something of value for supporting projects, whereas 
philanthropy motivation indicates the wish to provide charitable assistance to the projects. The prior 
literature in information systems suggests the role of those motivations in diverse contexts, including 
open source software developments (Roberts et al. 2006; von Krogh et al. 2012) and crowdsourcing 
(Arazy et al. 2012; Leimeister et al. 2009). While these studies have advanced our understanding of the 
role of participants’ motivations in their decision to participate, we know little about how those 
motivations impact their contribution behavior, such as the timing or the extent of contribution when 
they decide to participate. Thus, we examine the effect of funder motivations on funding timing and 
amount in the context of crowdfunding, in which funding progress is publicly shown to potential 
funders. We combine two sets of data from two reward-based crowdfunding platforms. We first 
collected data on project attributes and actual funding from the platforms. We then augmented the data 
with our funder surveys to capture funder motivations and their characteristics. Our final sample has 
559 funders for 131 projects that were launched from April to November 2013.  
The results of our analysis suggest the prominent role of two motivations in forming funder behavior. 
We find that reward motivation is associated with late funding, whereas philanthropy motivation is 
associated with early funding. This implies that funders with strong reward motivation participate later 
in a project when the project is highly likely to be successfully funded and their backing is rewarded. 
On the other hand, funders with strong philanthropic motivation are willing to contribute early to the 
project, since they just want to provide charitable support to the project. When it comes to funding 
amount, our results show that philanthropy motivation is positively associated with funding amount; 
moreover, the association becomes smaller as a campaign progresses. The association between reward 
motivation and funding amount is, if any, very weak on average. However, when examining an 
interaction effect between reward motivation and age, we find a significant and negative effect. This 
suggests that the association between reward motivation and funding amount is positive for younger 
funders, decreases as age increases, and becomes negative for older funders.  
Our study makes several significant contributions. First, it is the first paper to provide empirical evidence 
of the association between funders’ motivation and their funding behaviors in crowdfunding. As such, 
it extends the previous literature on crowdfunding, which has generally focused on the role of external 
factors, such as social influence and funder interaction within a platform (Burtch et al. 2013; Burtch et 
al. 2015; Kim et al. 2016; Mollick 2014). More broadly, our study contributes to the literature on crowd 
participation in online platforms by showing how motivation impacts actual participation. Especially, 
we show that motivation affects participation timing and the extent of participation, which received little 
attention in the previous literature. Finally, our study provides some practical implications for 
contribution management of crowds in crowd-driven marketplaces. 
 
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 Pioneering Literature in Crowdfunding Research  
The success drivers of crowdfunding projects represent one of the most important themes in 
crowdfunding research. In comparison to the selection criteria of venture capitals, definite evidence of 
past success, external endorsements, and a prepared demonstration are found to affect the project’s 
success (Mollick 2013). Based on social capital theory, Zheng et al.(2014) examine how project creators' 
social network ties, experience to fund other projects, and the shared meaning between the creator and 
the funders affect crowdfunding success. It has also been found that project creators’ personal networks 
and expressed project quality were associated with success (Mollick 2014). Lastly, a significant pattern 
has been verified: a project that had collected most of its funding did not draw participation from many 
potential funders, whereas successful projects showed a propensity for increasing project funders during 
the final funding period (Burtch et al. 2013; Kuppuswamy et al. 2013). 
Another stream of studies examined the factors affecting the individual funding decision. The demand 
for a crowdfunding project is estimated to be driven by peer effects (Ward et al. 2010), indicating the 
effect of social influence on individual funding decisions. Similarly, the effect of funders’ geographic 
origins on a crowdfunding project shows that the distance between a project creator and potential funders 
is important (Agrawal et al. 2011): local funders are more likely to pledge at earlier stages of the funding 
period than distant funders and those less responsive to the decisions of others. Kim et al. (2016) show 
that early funders with expertise have a distinctive influence on later funders in the crowd. Furthermore, 
the role of funders’ characteristics is examined—how those characteristics form their motivations (Ryu 
et al. 2016). Finally, from the perspective of platform design, permission to control the disclosure of 
funding information is found to result in an increase in the probability of contribution and a decrease in 
the amount of contribution at the same time (Burtch et al. 2015).  
 
2.2 Motivation in Information System Literature 
From motivational frameworks proposed by previous studies, we reviewed two dominant motivation 
dimensions: intrinsic vs. extrinsic and self-oriented vs. other-oriented. The division between intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation in the self-determination theory (SDT) is the most frequently referenced 
framework (Deci et al. 1985; Ryan et al. 2000a; Ryan et al. 2000b). The SDT considers a behavior as 
extrinsically motivated when it is conducted to acquire a significant outcome. On the other hand, a 
behavior is intrinsically motivated when it is performed for its own inherent joy, fun, or playfulness 
(Ryan et al. 2000a). Studies have shown how and why both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are 
activated in diverse contexts, including studying (Vallerand et al. 1992), pro-social activity (Grant 
2008), knowledge transfer (Teigland et al. 2009), online searching (Mathwick et al. 2004), and online 
games (Hsu et al. 2007). In relation to the context of crowd participation, it is found that participants’ 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are related to the contribution level in complex ways (Roberts et al. 
2006). For example, some types of extrinsic motivation (i.e., status motivation) enhance intrinsic 
motivation. In addition, when being compensated to contribute to crowdsourcing projects, extrinsic 
motivation leads to different levels of contribution whereas intrinsic motivation does not significantly 
impact contribution levels. In line with the results related to extrinsic motivation, participation in 
crowdsourcing projects was found to increase significantly in response to the incentives and at higher 
membership levels (Khansa et al. 2015; Leimeister et al. 2009). On the other hand, intrinsic motivation 
oriented toward accomplishment and achievement is also found to promote participation and 
engagement in crowdsourcing projects (Arazy et al. 2012). 
Next, depending on the type of orientation, motivations are divided into two different types: self-oriented 
motivation and other-oriented motivation (Hemetsberger 2002). Self-oriented motivation involves the 
uncomplicated link between an actor and an object (e.g., task, product), whereas other-oriented 
motivation is concerned with the actor’s social and emotional relationships around the object (Barnett 
et al. 1987). In the context of open source software development, potential contributors may participate 
in certain projects, inspired by self-oriented (e.g., fun, learning, pay), or other-oriented (e.g., altruism, 
reciprocity) motivation, or both (von Krogh et al. 2012). Furthermore, different types of motivations 
influence the level of contribution (Roberts et al. 2006). Status motivation leads to above-average 
contribution levels while use-value motivation leads to below-average contribution levels. Concerning 
the attitude toward the relationship with others, it is found that distrust of others and desire for status 
have a significant negative effect on the quantity of contribution in crowdsourcing projects, whereas 
only distrust of others is positively related to the quality of contribution (Hutter et al. 2015). Finally, in 
deciding technology acceptance, it is verified that men were more affected by self-oriented motivation 
(e.g., perceptions of usefulness) while women were more greatly influenced by other-oriented 
motivation (e.g., perceptions of subjective norm) (Venkatesh et al. 2000). 
 
3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Based on the motivation frameworks discussed earlier, we propose two core motivations for 
crowdfunding project funders: reward (i.e., extrinsic and self-oriented) and philanthropy (i.e., intrinsic 
and other-oriented) motivations (Brüggen et al. 2011; Holbrook 2002). The reward motivation is the 
desire to receive something of value for funding. This motivation is the representative form of extrinsic 
motivation (Deci et al. 1985; Ryan et al. 2000a; Ryan et al. 2000b) and is associated with “incentive 
motivation” (Ariely et al. 2009; Brüggen et al. 2011). A related study shows that receiving rewards is 
one of the main motivations for contributing to crowdfunding projects (Gerber et al. 2012). On the other 
hand, the philanthropy motivation is the wish to provide charitable assistance to the creators through a 
concern for humanity. This motivation is rooted in donor motivation (Hibbert et al. 1996; Merchant et 
al. 2008); however, its scope is broader than that of conventional charity campaigns. Funders also replied 
that they support crowdfunding projects because they want to support their causes and engage with other 
community members (Gerber et al. 2012). 
We may assume that once a funder’s motivation is activated, the motivation—regardless of which one 
it is—affects the behavioral intention to pledge funds. If the intention is strong enough and no disabler 
or inhibitor exists, actual behavior will occur (Ajzen 1991; Terborg et al. 1978). Furthermore, some 
motivations are supposed to directly influence the funding attribute (i.e., timing, amount), whereas 
others only determine whether a funder will pledge funds. As critical funder motivations, the reward 
and philanthropy motivations are expected to affect the funding timing and amount in this study.  
 
3.1 Motivation and Funding Timing 
Since most crowdfunding sites adopt the “all-or-nothing” mechanism for operating their platforms, 
funding timing is critical to the project creators and platform operators. If a project does not reach its 
goal amount by the pledge deadline, all transactions that occurred during the campaign are canceled, 
wasting resources for all players. Deciding the timing of the funding is important for funders as well. 
Funders with a higher level of reward motivation are expected to participate in the target project when 
its feasibility is sufficiently high. This tendency is also found in the venture capital community, where 
feasibility is one of the main criteria for evaluating startups (Krueger 1993). An empirical study has 
shown the propensity of successful projects to see a rapid increase in the number of funders during the 
final funding period, implying that most funders may have had higher reward motivation (Kuppuswamy 
et al. 2013). Therefore, it is supposed that a funder with higher reward motivation may postpone the 
funding until after the project has reached the target amount. Philanthropically motivated funders are 
expected to join a project in the early stages, since they are less sensitive to project feasibility and more 
willing to help creators gain early momentum in attracting funders. This tendency may be weakened 
after the project has collected enough funding, because potential funders will perceive the project as 
having already established enough funding (Kuppuswamy et al. 2013). Another study shows that the 
amount and timing of other funder contributions had a substitution effect on potential funders’ funding 
decisions (Burtch et al. 2013). Thus, we expect that funders’ philanthropy motivation will promote 
earlier participation, even before the project reaches the target amount. In sum, the above arguments 
motivate Hypothesis 1 and 2: 
 
H1. A funder’s reward motivation for supporting a crowdfunding project is associated with later 
funding. 
H2. A funder’s philanthropy motivation for supporting a crowdfunding project is associated with earlier 
funding.  
 
3.2 Motivation and Funding Amount 
In the typical crowdfunding reward design, funders can choose their pledge amount based on their 
reward-level preference. Funders who pay more can usually expect more or greater rewards. Many 
crowdfunding projects provide entry-level rewards to lower the initial barrier to participation. This type 
of reward includes a letter of thanks, an inclusion in the contributor list, or a mini souvenir. To obtain 
the main rewards, funders need to pledge more. Higher funder reward motivation indicates recognition 
of the reward value of the project and consideration of the costs and benefits of the reward (Macmillan 
et al. 1985; Ueda 2004). This also implies a desire for a higher-level reward. Hence, it is assumed that 
funders with higher levels of reward motivation tend to pledge more than other funders. Philanthropy 
motivation is expected to show the same direction of impact as reward motivation. Even philanthropy 
motivation is associated more with participation itself (Gerber et al. 2012); as the motivation is 
increasing, it may affect a funder’s intention to join the project’s cause and considerably raise the amount 
of funding. In the charitable context, donations are generally higher when participants focus on their 
feelings rather than on others in need (Dickert et al. 2011). In this situation, they cannot meet their goals 
with a minimum amount of funding. Thus, it is supposed that the more philanthropically-motivated 
funders tend to pledge greater amounts. Thus, we hypothesize the following: 
 
H3. A funder’s reward motivation for supporting a crowdfunding project is associated with a greater 
amount of funding.  
H4. A funder’s philanthropy motivation for supporting a crowdfunding project is associated with a 
greater amount of funding.  
 
4 RESEARCH METHOD 
To conduct our surveys, we collaborated with two reward-based crowdfunding platforms. We first 
compiled a list of all registered funders who had supported at least one project on either platform, and 
then sent them an e-mail newsletter with an embedded banner at the bottom introducing the survey. 
Prior to the main survey, subjects were instructed to specify the most recent project that they had 
supported and completed the survey based on that project experience. In total, we have 617 responders 
who contributed to 144 projects during the period of April to November 2013. Of the returned surveys, 
21 were eliminated for incompleteness (e.g., missing values) and 37 due to missing transaction data. We 
then also collected data on individual funding as well as characteristics of funded projects by our 
subjects. 
We used two dependent variables: funding timing and funding amount. Both variables are based on 
funders’ actual transaction data. Funding timing is the share of the raised amount of funding to the 
amount of the funding goal, which is set by a project creator. The variable is used to capture whether a 
funder backs a project later or not. When we use this variable in our model, we use various cutoff points 
(i.e., 100%, 30%, 60%, 90%, and 120%) to generate a binary variable. For instance, when we use 100% 
as a cutoff value, we create a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a funder’s funding timing is greater 
than 100%, and 0 otherwise. This allows us to test how funder motivations affect funding timing as a 
campaign progresses. Our second variable is the funding amount, which refers to the amount of a single 
backing by a funder. We log-transform this variable in our analysis.  
Our focal independent variables are two motivation variables: reward and philanthropy motivations. We 
primarily adopted the instruments used in Brüggen et al. (2011) and Grant (2008). The constructs and 
questionnaire items were converted into a revised form suitable for the specific context of crowdfunding. 
We use a multiple-item method based on a seven-point Likert scale, ranging from “strongly disagree” 
to “strongly agree.”  
Finally, our analysis includes several control variables, including demographic information (e.g., age, 
gender) and funding experience. Those are collected from our surveys and transaction data. We also 
include dummies for project type to capture inherent differences in funding behaviors across project 
types. Table 1 presents the operational definitions for these measures.  
 
Construct Operational Definition 
Dependent Variable: Funding Behavior 
Funding timing (FT) 
Whether a funder pledged before reaching 100% of the project’s goal amount (=1) or 
after that (=0) 
Funding amount (FA) Logarithm value of the actual funding amount 
Focal Independent Variable: Funder Motivation 
Reward motivation 
(RWRD) 
Degree to which a funder needs to receive something valuable in recompense for 
funding 
Philanthropy 
motivation (PHIL) 
Degree of a funder’s will to provide charitable assistance to the creator because of  a 
concern for humanity 
Control Variable 
Platform (PLTF), age (AGE, 10–19 = 1, 20–29 = 2, 30–39 = 3, 40–49 = 4, 50– = 5), sex (SEX, male = 1, 
female = 0), funding experience (FEXP, number of previous fundings), project type (publication, music, 
movie, game, arts, donation) 
Table 1. Operational Definition of Constructs 
 
In our final sample, we have 559 funders in 131 projects to test the hypotheses. The portion of female 
funders (64.2%) in our sample is almost twice that of male funders (35.8%). Funders in their 20s, among 
other age groups, are identified as the main contributing group (62.3%), followed by funders in their 30s 
(19.1%) and 10s (13.6%). In our sample, more than half of respondents (66.4%) are novice funders who 
have not experienced crowdfunding projects before. The platform operators confirmed that the gender, 
age, and funding experience ratios of the respondents were similar to those of all registered members, 
eliminating the potential for non-response bias. Table 2 outlines the demographic profile of the sample. 
 
Type Number % 
Gender 
Male 200 35.8 
Female 359 64.2 
Age 
10–19 years 
76 13.6 
20–29 years 
348 62.3 
30–39 years 
107 19.1 
40–49 years 
23 4.1 
50+ years  
5 0.9 
Platform 
A 257 46.0 
B 302 54.0 
Funding 
experience 
1 371 66.4 
2 66 11.8 
3 43 7.7 
4 28 5.0 
5 10 1.8 
6+ 41 7.3 
Total 559 100.0 
Table 2. Demographic Profile of the Respondents 
 
5 RESULTS 
5.1 Measurement Model 
We examined the internal consistency of the surveyed constructs using Cronbach’s α to assess the 
reliability of the measurements (Cronbach 1951). As shown in Table 2, the Cronbach’s alpha values of 
all constructs were greater than the acceptable level of 0.70, the lowest being 0.864 (Hair et al. 1998). 
To validate the measurement model, two types of validity were assessed: convergent validity and 
discriminant validity (Fornell et al. 1982). The convergent validity was assessed by examining the 
average variance extracted (AVE). The AVEs of the constructs were all greater than 0.70, indicating an 
acceptable level of convergent validity (Gefen et al. 2005). The discriminant validity was checked 
through the result of the confirmatory-factor analysis, which showed that each measurement item was 
weighted much higher on its assigned construct, confirming the item’s discriminant validity (see Table 
3 for detailed results). The descriptive statistics and correlations of variables are summarized in Table 
4. 
 
Construct Measurement Item 
Factor 
Weight 
AVE Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
RWRD 
(I decided to support the project in this service because…) 
of the reward I can get in return for my participation. 
0.916 
0.835 0.901 
I calculated that the reward would compensate my effort. 0.921 
The reward of the project is important to me. 0.905 
PHIL 
(I decided to support the project in this service because…) 
I want to help the creators of the project. 
0.818 
0.710 0.864 
I believe it is important that I assist the creators of the 
project. 
0.893 
I want to help the creators of the project to improve their 
output. 
0.852 
I find it is my responsibility to support the creators of the 
project. 
0.805 
Table 3. Measurement Items and Their Validity Assessments 
 
Variable 
Descriptive Statistics Correlations 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. RWRD 4.676 1.810 1 7 1.000               
2. PHIL 5.677 1.238 1 7 -0.059 1.000             
3. FA 9.978 0.746 6.907 12.611 -0.034 -0.005 1.000           
4. FT 0.611 0.487 0 1 0.148 0.027 0.006 1.000         
5. GNDR 0.357 0.479 0 1 0.048 -0.126 -0.035 -0.002 1.000       
6. AGE 2.164 0.739 1 5 -0.166 0.037 -0.038 0.137 0.132 1.000     
7. FEXP 2.141 2.693 1 27 0.014 -0.026 -0.022 -0.040 0.033 0.043 1.000   
8. PLTF 0.540 0.498 0 1 0.317 -0.046 -0.148 0.117 0.149 0.074 0.003 1.000 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix for Variables 
 
5.2 Regression Analysis 
We find support for Hypothesis 1, which predicts that reward motivation is associated with later funding. 
Column 1 of Table 4 shows that when a funder backs a project with a higher reward motivation, she is 
likely to do so later, after a campaign has met its funding goal. When we use different cutoff values, 
columns 2–5 suggest that this effect is realized even before the success of the campaign, if funders with 
strong reward motivations believe that the campaign is highly likely to succeed soon. This is consistent 
with the theory discussed in Section 2. Regarding the philanthropy motivation, our results also support 
Hypothesis 2. As expected, the philanthropy motivation is negatively associated with the dummy for 
100% of funding timing in column 1 of Table 5, although not significant. When we use different cutoff 
values, we see the significant effect of philanthropy motivation in early periods of a campaign. When a 
campaign is at an early stage, funders with strong philanthropy motivations tend to contribute earlier 
than those without. This effect disappears when a campaign nears the success of its goal. This implies 
that philanthropy motivation helps a campaign to gain momentum at early periods, which several studies 
have shown to be a crucial factor for crowdfunding success (Burtch et al. 2013; Colombo et al. 2015). 
With respect to the control variables, our results are in line with expectations. We find a negative 
association between age and the funding timing, implying that older people tend to contribute earlier 
(Midlarsky et al. 1989). Also, we find that funding experience is associated with early funding (Kim et 
al. 2016). This might imply that experienced funders are more engaged in the community and more 
confident about early funding.  
 
 
 Variables 
DV= Funding Timing 
(1) FT=1 if 
funding timing 
>= 100% 
(2) FT=1 if 
funding timing 
>= 30% 
(3) FT=1 if 
funding timing 
>= 60% 
(4) FT=1 if 
funding timing 
>= 90% 
(5) FT=1 if 
funding timing 
>= 120% 
RWRD 0.029** 0.008 0.017 0.030** 0.028**  
(0.013) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012)  
PHIL -0.020 -0.032** -0.036* -0.018 -0.012  
(0.016) (0.014) (0.021) (0.018) (0.014)  
PLTF -0.419*** -0.072 -0.195** -0.338*** -0.462*** 
(0.097) (0.058) (0.086) (0.098) (0.114)  
GNDR 0.091 0.057 0.012 0.056 0.094  
(0.058) (0.046) (0.054) (0.059) (0.063)  
AGE -0.059** -0.016 -0.056** -0.063*** -0.065**  
(0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.023) (0.025)  
FEXP -0.060 -0.072*** -0.061** -0.055* -0.060**  
(0.031) (0.023) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029)  
Project 
Category 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  559 559 559 559 559  
Adjusted R2 0.183 0.034 0.054 0.140 0.234  
Table 5. Results of Regression Analysis (DV = Funding Timing) 
Notes: This table reports the results of OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at project level. Standard errors are given 
in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 6 shows OLS results on funding amount. Our results provide marginal support for Hypothesis 3 
on the association between reward motivation and funding amount. When we have the full sample in 
column 1, the association between reward motivation and funding amount is positive—which is 
consistent with our expectation—but not significant. When we look at different cutoff points, the 
association is generally insignificant, except for when we use 60% as a cutoff point. Overall, Hypothesis 
3 is marginally supported. This implies that reward motivation might lead funders, (especially early 
funders) to contribute a greater amount to a project although this is statistically weak. The results suggest 
that funders with reward motivation would increase the funding amount only within a certain timing 
range, excluding the earlier stage and the period after the projects have almost reached the goal amount. 
They might not add more funding in the very early stage because the risk of failure to receive the reward 
still exists. They also moderate the funding amount when the accumulated amount has almost reached 
the bar, because there is a high probability that others will contribute the required amount. Regarding 
the association between philanthropy motivation and funding amount in Hypothesis 4, our results 
provide supporting evidence for the hypothesis. When we use the full sample in column 1, the 
association is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that when a funder has a strong 
philanthropy motivation, she tends to pledge more. This finding complements a prior finding that 
intrinsic (Arazy et al. 2012) and other-oriented (von Krogh et al. 2012) motivation is promoting 
participation and engagement in crowd-driven platforms. Moreover, our additional analyses in columns 
2–5 show that the association is stronger for early funders. This result shows the significant relationship 
between motivation and funding amount, especially for early funders. In the special context of the “all-
or-nothing” mechanism, securing the goal amount is the most critical point for every crowdfunding 
project creator. In this sense, reaching the goal amount is regarded as a shared goal among project 
creators and their early funders, especially the philanthropically motivated ones. Along with our findings 
related to Hypothesis 2, this implies that philanthropy motivation is a crucial factor to encourage early 
funding with larger amounts, which should be a key driver for any campaign’s success (Burtch et al. 
2013; Colombo et al. 2015).  
 
Variables DV = Funding Amount 
(1) Full Sample (2) FT <= 30% (3) FT <= 60% (4) FT <= 90% (5) FT <= 120% 
RWRD 
0.037 0.045 0.078** 0.047 0.036  
(0.028) (0.047) (0.038) (0.029) (0.027)  
PHIL 
0.032* 0.129** 0.085** 0.050* 0.028  
(0.019) (0.058) (0.035) (0.027) (0.022)  
PLTF 
-0.101 -0.227 -0.118 -0.063 -0.102  
(0.154) (0.255) (0.237) (0.216) (0.181)  
GNDR 
-0.092 -0.217 -0.218 -0.142 -0.184  
(0.118) (0.158) (0.146) (0.143) (0.121)  
AGE 
0.174*** 0.204* 0.235*** 0.242*** 0.231*** 
(0.056) (0.120) (0.086) (0.069) (0.068)  
FEXP 
-0.014 0.015 -0.038 -0.023 -0.028  
(0.061) (0.099) (0.081) (0.069) (0.064)  
Project 
Category 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  
559 125 220 311 399  
Adjusted R2 
0.090 0.165 0.171 0.145 0.146  
Table 6. Results of Regression Analysis (DV = Funding Amount) 
Notes: This table reports the results of OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at project level. Standard errors are given 
in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 Discussion 
The results of our study present the prominent role of two motivations in understanding and explaining 
a crowdfunding funder’s behavior. Reward motivation is a powerful predictor, but it is not a game 
changer because it tends to delay the pledge until after a project reaches the goal amount, which is the 
most critical point for the crowdfunding project. Instead, it has another important role of generating 
backup supporters that lead to additional funding for projects. In other words, there need to be other 
attractions to transform funders with reward motivation into early movers. In contrast, the philanthropy 
motivation was useful for attracting early funders, whereas it is hard to expect that funders with a 
philanthropy motivation will actively participate in crowdfunding projects after reaching the goal 
amount.  
From the perspective of the funding amount, and based on the finding of both motivations’ effects, we 
can discuss the diverse relationship between the effects and other factors such as funding timing and age 
difference. The influence of funding timing on the relationships between the motivations and the funding 
amount generates important implications. In the special context of the “all-or-nothing” mechanism, 
which almost all crowdfunding platforms adopted as their default funding systems, securing the goal 
amount is the most critical point for the creators of every crowdfunding project. In this sense, it is 
regarded as a shared goal among project creators and their early funders. In earlier stages, the role of 
philanthropy funders is substantial. They pledge relatively more in those stages, because they want to 
contribute to the completion of the project. Naturally, after the project has reached the goal amount, this 
increment disappears. Reward-motivated funders are rather sensitive to the range of timing. They may 
increase their funding amount only in a certain range of timing, excluding the very early stage of funding 
and the stage after the projects have almost reached the goal amount. They would not add more value in 
the very earlier stage because there still exists the risk of failure to receive the expected reward. They 
also might moderate the funding amount after the accumulated funding has almost reached the bar, 
because there is a high probability that some others would fill the gap. Thus, it is required to understand 
and leverage the “selfishness” of reward-motivated funders for successfully securing the goal amount. 
6.2 Conclusion 
Our paper empirically validated the effect of motivation on actual crowdfunding behavior, using a rich 
dataset that combined several dimensions of variables. Whereas most previous empirical studies adopted 
either transactional or survey data mainly at a project level, we conducted a survey of crowdfunding 
memberships and utilized the transactional data for an in-depth understanding. The findings and 
implications of this study offered several contributions to both the academic and the practical domains.  
In scholarly terms, we believe that our empirical study advances the understanding of crowdfunding at 
an individual level. We suggested the framework of dimensions and types of motivation to explain users’ 
behavior in crowdfunding situations. Specifically, to the best of our knowledge, this is the very first 
study to examine the direct role of motivation in forming characteristics of funder behaviors. We also 
verified the important roles of motivation in the information systems context, particularly for crowd 
participation in online platforms; prior literature in those domains rather focuses on the relationship 
between motivations and the contribution itself. Finally, our study extends the literature on the effect of 
demographic differences on financial behavior. The results confirm the distinctive characteristic of 
reward-based crowdfunding as a combination of charity and investment. 
Furthermore, our paper also contributed to the practical domain, particularly for both crowdfunding 
platform operators and potential project creators. We suggested the existence of diverse types of funders 
in crowdfunding platforms. Based on their motivations, platform operators and potential project creators 
must target the appropriate funders; understanding the characteristics of potential funders and differently 
targeting them is critical for the success of crowdfunding projects. The results of our study imply that 
understanding their motivations and characteristics is very important in order to satisfy users. The results 
of our study also offered practical advice. Primarily, we proposed a strategy for successful funding and 
reward design. Each strategy must be selected based on the project’s characteristics, and targeting a 
suitable early-funder group is the first step to success. Moreover, promoting funders’ reward motivation 
for further success is important. By proposing “first come, first served” or upgrade options (i.e., adding 
functions for more funding), reward-motivated funders are also stimulated to participate.  
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